ABSTRACT. We study existence and uniqueness of continuous-time stochastic Radner equilibria in an incomplete market model among a group of agents whose preference is characterized by cash invariant time-consistent monetary utilities. An assumption of "smallness" type is shown to be sufficient for existence and uniqueness. In particular, this assumption encapsulates settings with small endowments, small time-horizon, or a large population of weakly heterogeneous agents. Central role in our analysis is played by a fully-coupled nonlinear system of quadratic BSDEs.
INTRODUCTION
The equilibrium problem. The focus of the present paper is the problem of existence and uniqueness of a competitive (Radner) equilibrium in an incomplete continuous-time stochastic model of a financial market. A discrete version of our model was introduced by Radner in [Rad82] as an extension of the classical Arrow-Debreu framework, with the goal of understanding how asset prices in financial (or any other) markets are formed, under minimal assumption on the ingredients or the underlying market structure. One of those assumptions is often market completeness; more precisely, it is usually postulated that the range of various types of transactions the markets allow is such that the wealth distribution among agents, after all the trading is done, is Pareto optimal, i.e., that no further redistribution of wealth can make one agent better off without hurting somebody else. Real markets are not complete; in fact, as it turns out, the precise way in which completeness fails matters greatly for the output and should be understood as an a-priori constraint. Indeed, it is instructive to ask the following questions: Why are markets incomplete in the first place? Would rational economic agents not continue introducing new assets into the market, as long as it is still useful? The answer is that they, indeed, would, were it not for exogenously-imposed constraints Allowing the agents to insure each other only with respect to the risks contained in dB, we denote the (equilibrium) price of such an "asset" by −λ t dt. As already hinted to above, one possible economic rationale behind this type of constraint is obtained by thinking of dB as the readilyavailable (fast) information, while dW models slower information which will be incorporated into the process λ t indirectly, and only at later dates. For simplicity, we also fix the spot interest rate to 0, allowing agents to transfer wealth from t to t + dt costlessly and profitlessly. Since in our setting consumption can occur only at terminal time, the interest rate can be taken exogenously. The normalization of zero interest rate is for expositional simplicity and is commonly used for model without intertemporal consumption, cf, eg. [LV03] .
For mathematical convenience, and to be able to access the available continuous-time results, we concatenate all short-lived assets with payoffs dB t and prices −λ t dt into a single asset B λ t = B t + t 0 λ u du. It should not be thought of as an asset that carries a dividend at time T , but only as a single-object representation of the family of all infinitesimal, short-lived assets.
As a context for the "fast-and-slow" constraint, we consider a finite number I of agents; we assume that their preference structure is characterized by a class of dynamic monetary utilities.
Our probabilistic-analytic approach. The direction of the present paper is partially similar to that of [Žit12] , where a much simpler model of the "fast-and-slow" type is introduced and considered. Here, however, the setting is different and somewhat closer to [Zha12] and [CL15] . The fast component is modeled by an independent Brownian motion, instead of the one-jump process. Also, unlike in any of the above papers, pure PDE techniques are largely replaced or supplemented by probabilistic ones, and much stronger results are obtained.
Doing away with the Markovian assumption, we allow for a collection of unbounded random variables, satisfying suitable integrability assumptions, to act as random endowments and characterize the equilibrium as a (functional of a) solution to a nonlinear system of quadratic BSDEs. Unlike single quadratic BSDE, whose theory is by now quite complete (see e.g., [Kob00, BH06, BH08, DHB11, EB13, BEK13] for a sample), the systems of quadratic BSDEs are much less understood. The main difficulty is that the comparison theorem may fail to hold for BSDE systems (see [HP06] ). Moreover, Frei and dos Reis (see [FdR11] ) constructed a quadratic BSDE system which has bounded terminal condition but admits no solution. The strongest general-purpose result seems to be the one of Tevzadze (see [Tev08] ), which guarantees existence under an "L ∞ -smallness" condition placed on the terminal conditions. Like in [Tev08] , but unlike in [Žit12] or [CL15] , our general result imposes no regularity conditions on the agents' random endowments. Unlike in [Tev08] , we allow here for unbounded terminal conditions (random endowments), and measure their size using an "entropic" BMO-type norm strictly weaker than the L ∞ -norm. Existence of equilibria is established when random endowments have small entropic-BMO-norm. In addition, the equilibrium constructed is unique in a global sense (as in [KP16] , where a different quadratic BSDE system is studied). One interesting feature of our general result is that it is independent of the number of agents (number of equations in the BSDE system). This is different from [Tev08] and leads to the following observation: the equilibrium exists as soon as "sufficiently many sufficiently homogeneous" (under an appropriate notion of homogeneity) agents share a given total endowment, which is not assumed to be small. This is precisely the natural context of a number of competitive equilibrium models with a large number of small agents, none of whom has a dominating sway over the price.
Another feature of our general result is its independence of is the time horizon. Indirectly, this leads to the fact that existence and uniqueness also holds when the time horizon is sufficiently small, but the random endowments are not limited in size. Under the additional assumption of Malliavin differentiabilty, a lower bound on how small the horizon has to be to guarantee existence and uniqueness turns out to be inversely proportional to the size of the (Malliavin) derivatives of random endowments. This extends [CL15, Theorem 3.1] to a non-Markovian setting. Interestingly, both the L ∞ -smallness of the random endowments and the smallness of the time-horizon are implied by the small-entropic-BMO-norm condition mentioned above, and the existence theorems under these conditions can be seen as special cases of our general result.
Some notational conventions.
As we will be dealing with various classes of vector-valued random variables and stochastic processes, we shall introduce sufficiently compact notation to make reading more palatable. A time horizon T > 0 is fixed throughout. An equality sign between random variables signals almost-sure equality, while one between two processes signifies Lebesgue-almost everywhere, almost sure equality. Any two processes that are equal in this sense will be identified; this, in particular, applies to indistinguishable càdlàg processes. Let (Ω, F T , F = {F t } t∈[0,T ] , P) be a filtrated probability space, whose filtration F is the augmented filtration generated by two independent Brownian motion B, W and satisfies the usual conditions of completeness and right-continuity. T denotes the set of all [0, T ]-valued F-stopping times, and P 2 denotes the set of all predictable pro-
with respect to an F-Brownian motionB is alternatively denoted by µ ·B, while the stochastic (Doléans-Dade) exponential retains the standard notation E(·). The L p -spaces, p ∈ [1, ∞] are all defined with respect to
(Ω, F T , P), L 0 denotes the set of (P-equivalence classes) of finite-valued random variables on this space. For a continuous adapted process
and denote by S ∞ the space of all such Y with ||Y || S ∞ < ∞. For p ≥ 1, the space of all µ ∈ P 2 with ||µ||
Given a probability measureP and aP-martingale M, we define its BMO-norm by
denotes conditional expectation with respect to F τ , computed underP. The set of allP-martingales M with ||M|| BMO(P) < ∞ is denoted by BMO(P), or, simply, BMO, whenP = P. When applied to random variables, X ∈ BMO(P) means that X = M T , for some M ∈ BMO(P). In the same vein, we define (for some, and then any, (P, F)-Brownian motionB) bmo(P) = {µ ∈ P 2 : µ ·B ∈ BMO(P)}, with the norm ||µ|| bmo(P) = ||µ ·B|| BMO(P) . The same convention as previously is used: the dependence onP is suppressed whenP = P. Many of our objects will take values in R I , for some fixed I ∈ N. Those are typically denoted by bold letters such as E, µ, ν, α, etc. If specific components are needed, they will be given a superscript -e.g., E = (E i ) i . Unquantified variables i, j always range over {1, 2, . . . , I}. The topology of R I is induced by the Euclidean norm | · | 2 , defined by
All standard operations and relations (including the absolute value |·| and order ≤)
between R k -valued variables are considered componentwise.
1. MONETARY UTILITIES 1.1. Relative entropy. We begin with a convention which extends the definition of expectation to L 0 . For any random variable G ∈ L 0 and probability measure Q ∼ P, set
where, as usual, G + = max{G, 0} and G − = max{−G, 0}. Furthermore, define
to be the relative entropy of Q with respect to P, and define also the pair (p(Q), q(Q)) of predictable processes implicitly via the density dQ/dP
The following lemma is similar to a standard result from the literature, but requires a separate proof due to our use of the nonstandard dual domain Q.
Lemma 1.1. It holds that
Furthermore, we have
(1.1) 1.2. Definition and properties. In the sequel, we shall consider a random field f : Ω × [0, T ] × R 2 → R + with the following properties.
• for all (p, q) ∈ R 2 , f (·, ·, p, q) is a predictable process;
satisfying Df (ω, t, 0, 0) = (0, 0), and there exist constants 0 < δ ≤ ∆ < ∞ such that both eigenvalues of the Hessian
In the sequel, and in order to simplify notation, in random fields like f , whenever we want to stress dependence of (p, q) ∈ R 2 , we write 
Whenever f satisfies Assumption 1.2, Lemma 1.1 implies that
Therefore, and recalling the conventions regarding expectations in §1.1, one may define a mapping
3)
The thus-defined functional U is called a monetary utility function, and f the penalty function associated to it. Using (1.1) and (1.2), we obtain entropic upper and lower bounds for U, namely
It follows in a straightforward way from the above that the following properties are valid, where
• Positivity:
• Concavity:
• Monetary invariance:
• Fatou property:
Example 1.3. The simplest-but far from the only-example of a monetary utility as described above is when the penalty function f satisfies
where η is a predictable process such that δ ≤ η ≤ ∆ holds for constants 0 < δ ≤ ∆ < ∞. Here, η(ω, t) may be loosely interpreted as a state-time dependent, on (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0, T ], risk tolerance coefficient. For constant η, Lemma 1.1 implies that U is entropic utility.
SINGLE-AGENT MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
2.1. The financial market. Our model of a financial market features one liquidly traded risky asset, whose value, denoted in terms of a prespecified numéraire which we normalize to 1, is given by dB
for some λ ∈ bmo. Given that it will play a role of a "free parameter" in our analysis, the volatility in (2.1) is normalized to 1; this way, λ can simultaneously be interpreted as the market price of risk. For technical reasons explained below, it will be enough to assume for our purposes that λ ∈ bmo. The reader should consult the subsection 'The "fast-and-slow" model' in the introduction for the proper economic interpretation of this asset as a concatenation of a continuum of infinitesimally-short-lived securities.
2.2. The entropic BMO space. In order to describe the appropriate regularity class for the agents' random endowments, which will be larger than L ∞ , we shall need the following space, described via solvability of a certain quadratic BSDE: 
An exponentiation of the negative of both sides of (2.2) yields
where
meaning that G ∈ EBMO if and only if e −G is the last element of a stochastic exponential of a BMO martingale. Less formally, EBMO = − log E(BMO). Characterization and properties of EBMO are presented separately in Appendix A. For G ∈ EBMO we define the following seminorm-like quantity which, in an abuse of terminology, we still call an EBMO semi-norm:
Since || · || EBMO lacks the homogeneity property, we also introduce the following family:
and note that G/δ ∈ EBMO if and only if the equation at time T ; we shall assume throughout that E + ∈ p>1 L p (P), and E/δ ∈ EBMO.
The agent maximizes the expected utility at the terminal time T arising from trading and random endowment:
where the portfolio process {π t } t∈ [0,T ] represents the number of shares of the asset kept by the agent, and belongs to an admissible class described below. As usual, this strategy is financed by investing in or borrowing from the interest-free numéraire asset, as needed. To our best knowledge, solution to (2.5) for dynamic monetary utility U was missing from the literature. Proposition 2.4 below establishes the existence and uniqueness of the optimal portfolio process {π 
A strategy π is said to be λ-admissible if π ∈ A λ , where
For each π ∈ bmo and
The maximization problem in (2.5), posed over π ∈ A λ , is called the primal problem. The definitions of U and A λ yields the following weak-duality bound
with the minimization problem on the right-hand side is called the dual problem. We remark that the expectation in the definition of the dual problem exists in (−∞, ∞], thanks to Proposition A.2 item (2) and the L p -integrability requirement in the definition of M λ .
Our next result characterizes the value of the dual problem via a BSDE. Given the market price of risk λ ∈ bmo, f satisfying Assumption 1.2, and a random endowment E ∈ L 0 such that 1
For each π ∈ bmo, energy inequalities in [Kaz94, Page 26] imply that π ∈ H p for every p ≥ 1. This fact combined
and E/δ ∈ EBMO, define the process
Before characterizing Y λ , we introduce the partial conjugate h : (1) h(·, ·) is concave in the first argument and convex in the second, and satisfies
and there exist constants γ > 0 and
(3) There exists a constant Θ > 0 such that, for all p,p, ν,ν ∈ R, we have
Now we characterize Y λ via a BSDE in the following result:
Then, the process Y λ admits a continuous modification and has the following properties:
λ is the unique solution to the BSDE
with (µ, ν) ∈ bmo 2 , where h is given by (2.8).
Our next task is to identify the optimal investment strategy for the primal problem, using the solution of the dual. 
Proposition 2.4. Let λ ∈ bmo, f satisfying Assumption 1.2, and E
belongs to bmo and is the unique optimal investment strategy for the primal problem (2.5).
3. EQUILIBRIUM 3.1. Equilibrium. We consider a finite number I ∈ N of economic agents. Their preferences are modelled by monetary utilities with penalty functions (f i ) i , and receive random endowments
We impose the following assumption.
In the context of Assumption 3.1, we set
and introduce the shortcuts
The pair (E, f ), where
, of endowments and penalty functions fully characterizes the behavior of the agents in the model; we call it the population characteristics-E is the initial allocation and f the risk profile. Given a market price of risk process λ, each agent maximizes the expected utility of trading and random endowment in the incomplete financial market of (2.5).
Definition 3.2 (Equilibrium)
. For a population with characteristics (E, f ), a process λ ∈ bmo is called an equilibrium (market price of risk) if there exists an I-tuple (π i ) i such that i) each π i is an optimal strategy for the agent i under λ, i.e.
The set of all equilibria is denoted by Λ(E, f ).
Remark 3.3. While it is conceivable that an equilibrium market price of risk λ may exist outside bmo, we restrict our attention only to the latter class. It is a natural ambient space, given our assumptions on E. Moreover, when λ ∈ bmo there are no known workable conditions which guarantee the existence of optimal strategies for our agents. Therefore, we include the condition λ ∈ bmo in the very definition of an equilibrium, and make all our uniqueness statements with respect to this class, only.
3.2. A BSDE characterization of equilibria. The BSDE-based description in Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 of the solution of a single agent's optimization problem is the main ingredient in the following characterization.
Theorem 3.4 (BSDE characterization of equilibria). Given λ ∈ bmo, and population characteristics (E, f ) which satisfy Assumption 3.1, the following are equivalent:
, satisfy the following BSDE system:
Remark 3.5.
(1) Given the results of Lemma 2.2, under the conditions imposed on the drivers f i , the system in (3.3) is a genuine system of BSDE. Indeed, under Assumption 3.1, each h i is a strictly concave in the first variable, for each value of the second variable. This way, the condition
where H −1 denotes inverse in the first spatial argument. This expression for λ substituted into the first I equations in (3.3), yielding a fully coupled system of BSDE with a quadratic driver. (2) While quite meaningless from the competitive point of view, the case I = 1 in the above characterization still admits a meaningful interpretation. The notion of an equilibrium here corresponds to the choice of λ under which an agent, with random endowment E ∈ EBMO would choose not to invest in the market at all. The system (3.3) reduces to a single equation
is the convex conjugate of f and satisfies
Since E/δ ∈ EBMO, Proposition A.2 item (1) implies E/∆ ∈ EBMO as well. Therefore the previous BSDE admits a unique solution, highlighting the role of EBMO as the natural space in the context of stochastic equilibria with monetary utilities.
3.3. Existence and uniqueness. Now follows our main result.
Theorem 3.6 (Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium).
Suppose that the population characteristics (E, f ) satisfy Assumption 3.1. For δ and ∆ given by (3.1), there exists a constant M = M(δ, ∆) > 0 such that whenever
there exists a unique equilibrium λ ∈ bmo. Moreover, the triplet (Y , µ, ν), whose components are defined in Proposition 2.3, is the unique solution to (3.3) with (µ, ν) ∈ bmo 2I .
Remark 3.7.
(1) The requirement ||E i || EBMO,δ i ≤ M can be fulfilled in several ways. The most important ones are:
"smallness" in EBMO is implied by "smallness" in L ∞ of the random endowment 
two additional remarks can be made:
(
and E c ∈ EBMO, statement of Theorem 3.6 still holds when condition (3.4) is translated closer to some Pareto optimal allocation, i.e.,
where dP c dP
(2) In a Markovian setting where E = g(X T ) for bounded and Hölder continuous g, and a diffusion X driven by B and W , [XZ16, Theorem 3.1] proves the global existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. This result is obtained using an analytic approach, and is only applicable in the Markovian setting.
3.4. An economic implication of Theorem 3.6. A novel and interesting feature of (3.4) is its lack of dependence on the number of agents I; this has profound economic effects and leads to the existence of equilibria in an economically meaningful asymptotic regime with "large" number of agents. Given a total endowment E Σ ∈ L ∞ to be shared among I agents, i.e., i E i = E Σ , one can ask the following question: how many and what kind of agents need to share this total endowment so that they can form a financial market in which an equilibrium exists? The answer turns out to be "sufficiently many sufficiently homogeneous agents". In order show that, we first make precise what we mean by sufficiently homogeneous. For the population characteristics E = (E i ) i and f = (f i ) i , with E ∈ (L ∞ ) I and f satisfying Assumption 3.1, we define the endowment
We think of a population of agents as "sufficiently homogeneous" if χ
With this in mind, we have the following corollary of Theorem 3.6: Corollary 3.9 (Existence of equilibria for sufficiently many sufficiently homogeneous agents).
Given a critical endowment homogeneity index χ
satisfying Assumption 3.1 and
admits a unique equilibrium.
PROOFS
4.1. Proof of Lemma 1.1. For the first identity, given Q ∈ Q, let Z be a continuous version of the martingale
]. The L p -integrability of Z for small enough p > 1 and the convexity of ϕ(z) = z log z imply that ϕ(Z) is a uniformly P-integrable submartingale, and, therefore, of class
where p ≡ p(Q) and q ≡ q(Q), and a localization argument based on the class (D) property give
where the last equality follows from integration-by-parts and another localization argument. We now move to the proof of (1.1). We shall prove the special case δ = 1, since the general case follows by simply applying the special case to G/δ. First, assume that G is bounded from below, i.e., G − ∈ L ∞ . A use of Jensen's inequality applied to the exponential function yields
, which is well defined and an element of Q because G − ∈ L ∞ , we have the equality − log E P [e
for all n from what we have just proved. Taking the infimum over n in both sides of the last equality, and using the monotone convergence theorem on the left-hand-side, and interchanging the two infima and using the convention regarding expectation from §1.1, (1.1) follows.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.
We suppress the subscript t throughout the proof. Statement (1) follows by direct inspection and (1.2). For (2), we start by noting that Assumption 1.2 provides additional bounds for second-order partial derivatives of f . Indeed, the constants δ and ∆ have the property that δ ≤ 1 2
and, so, with x = ∂ 11 f ≥ 0 and y = ∂ 22 f ≥ 0, we have x + y ≤ 2∆ and xy ≥ δ 2 . We can deduce from this, by the mean-value theorem and the convexity of f in the second argument, that q → ∂ 2 f t (p, q) is continuous and strictly (at least linearly, in fact) increasing, and that its range is R, for each value of p. Consequently, for each (p, ν) ∈ R 2 , the equation
It follows immediately that
has a unique solution, which we denote by q(p, ν). The implicit-function theorem further implies that q is a C 1 function of both of its arguments. Noting that
we conclude that h ∈ C 1 and, upon differentiating both sides in both arguments, obtain
These relations upgrade the regularity of h to C 2 and allow us to perform direct computations which yield
The lower bound on ∂ 22 f obtained above, and the original bounds from Assumption 1.2, imply (2). The equality Dh(0, 0) = (0, 0) is a direct consequence of (1). For (3), we use the fact that all second derivatives of h are uniformly bounded, together with Dh(0, 0) = (0, 0), to conclude that (2.9), for some constant Θ, for all (p, ν). The Lipschitz property (2.10) follows from (2.9) by the mean-value theorem.
Turning to (4), we use the mean-value theorem again to obtain
for somep. It remains to use the bounds in (2) and the fact that h(p, 0) ≥ 0, for all p. . We record it here in order to also introduce some notation needed for later. Note that it only involves bounded random variables; we shall use this result in a "localization" argument in the proof of Proposition 2.4.
Dynamic monetary utility and its BSDE representation. A dynamic version of the monetary utility
U in (1.3) can be defined for G ∈ L 0 via U t (G) = essinf E Q t G + T t f u (p u (Q), q u (Q))du Q ∈ Q , t ∈ [0, T ].
Lemma 4.1. For any G ∈ L ∞ , U admits a continuous modification which is the unique solution
is the convex conjugate of the penalty function f , and satisfies Remark 4.3. In the notation of Lemma 4.1, the probability measureQ, given by
is the unique minimizer in (4.1) above. Since g is convex and of quadratic growth in the spatial arguments, its partial derivatives ∂ j g, j = 1, 2, grow at most linearly. Given that (µ, ν) ∈ bmo, we have ∂ j g(µ, ν) ∈ bmo, as well, and the fact thatQ ∈ Q follows from the reverse Hölder inequality (cf. [Kaz94, Theorem 3.1]).
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Part (i): First, the assumptions
, combined with Hölder's inequality, imply that E + ∈ L 1 (Q λ ). The bounds in (1.2) and Lemma 1.1 below it, together with the assumption λ ∈ bmo, imply
Applied conditionally, the same argument can be used to extended the validity of the above inequalities for each t ∈ [0, T ]. It remains to note that δ log
Part (ii): When E is bounded, the claim that Y λ satisfies (2.11) follows from an argument similar to the one in [DHB11, Theorem 2.2, 2 ⇒ 6]. When, as assumed, E/δ belongs to EBMO, the BSDE characterization (2.11) is proved using the localization argument of [BH06, Theorem 2], thanks to the bounds for Y in (i).
The remaining question is whether (µ, ν) ∈ bmo. To show that it is, in fact, true, we first note that 
Thanks to Lemma 2.2, part (1), the right-hand side is bounded from below by E
, while an upper bound for the left-hand side is given by
These estimates imply that ν ∈ bmo(Q λ ), and the isomorphism theorem [Kaz94, Theorem 3.6] implies that ν ∈ bmo, as well.
To show that µ ∈ bmo, we first prove that Y − X E,δ belongs to
it will be enough to show that Y − X E,δ is bounded from above. To this end, we compute the
(4.4)
Using the lower bound for h, the class (D) property of both Y and X E,δ under Q λ , and the fact that
where the right-hand side is bounded from above, uniformly in t, due to the bmo(Q λ ) property of λ, ν, m E,δ and n E,δ .
The obtained bounds in bmo and S ∞ , used together with Itô's formula applied to (Y − X E,δ ) 2 and facilitated by (4.4), imply that µ − m E,δ ∈ bmo(Q λ ). Another appeal to [Kaz94, Theorem 3.6] yields µ ∈ bmo.
Finally, we turn to uniqueness for (2.11), and consider two solutions (Y, µ, ν) and (Ỹ ,μ,ν).
By convexity, we have h(p, ν)
where q * denotes the process q * (λ, ν). The bounds in (2.9) in Lemma 2.2 imply that q * ∈ bmo.
Therefore, the probability measure Q λ, * , defined by dQ λ, * /dP = E(− λ u dB u − q * u dW u ) T is well defined. Moreover, thanks to the bmo property of (µ, ν) and (μ,ν), the stochastic integrals on the right hand side of (4.5) above are Q λ, * -martingales. A projection onto F t under Q λ, * of both sides of (4.5) yields Y ≤Ỹ . The reverse inequality is proved similarly. 
happens to be bounded, uniqueness of (4.2) implies that
and the optimality of π follows from (2.6).
T is unbounded, we employ a localization argument using the nondecreasing 
Therefore, the equality in (4.7) above and the nonnegativity of f yield 
We have from Hölder's inequality that
is a class (D) process under Q, which confirms the claim that {Y λ τn } n is bounded from above by a uniformly integrable family under Q. So we can use Fatou's lemma to conclude that
. For the stochastic integral on the right-hand side of (4.8), similar argument as above yields
where 1/p + 1/q = 1/p ′ + 1/q ′ = 1 and p, p ′ are sufficiently close to 1. For the third expectation on the right-hand side, since is uniformly integrable in n under Q λ . Thus, the third expectation in (4.9) vanishes as τ n → T and we obtain
Therefore,
and the optimality of π λ follows from (2.6). Moreover the minimal measure is attained atQ λ ∼ P,
given by
To prove uniqueness, we take a another optimal strategyπ and observe that, thanks to its optimality, the two inequalities in
are, in fact, equalities. In particular, theQ λ -supermartingaleπ · B λ is aQ λ -martingale, and
The previous identity and [DHB11, Proposition 2.1, item 2)] imply that U t (E+π·B
It is dominated by another
These two martingales, in fact, coincide because they satisfy the same terminal condition. In particular, we have
This submartingale property combined with theQ λ -martingale
for any [0, T ]-valued stopping time τ . In particular, when τ = τ k where τ k = inf{t ≥ 0 :
2) with a bounded terminal condition implies that
Comparing this with the dynamics in (2.11), and using the uniqueness of the semimartingale decomposition, we obtain µ λ =μ −π, ν λ =ν, and
Concavity of h t in its first argument yields µ λ +π = −∂ 1 h t (λ, ν λ ) and confirmsπ = π λ .
Proof of Theorem 3.4. (1) ⇒ (2).
Given an equilibrium λ ∈ Λ(E, f ), let π i be the primal optimizer for agent i. The uniqueness statement in Proposition 2.4 identifies
is the unique solution of (2.11) with terminal condition Y i,λ
implies that π i is optimal for agent i when the market price of risk is λ, and the market-clearing condition is satisfied since
4.7. Proof of Theorem 3.6. Any object that depends only on δ and ∆ from Theorem 3.6 will be called universal. In particular we will talk about universal constants ε and C, as well as about a universal functionε(M) : [0, ε) → (0, ∞) in the sequel. When appearing in the same proof, we allow their values to change from appearance to appearance, without explicit mention. Moreover, all universal constants are assumed to be strictly positive. We start by setting up a framework for the Banach fixed-point theorem in the space bmo. Given λ ∈ bmo and i ∈ 1, . . . , I, let Y i,λ and (µ i,λ , ν i,λ ) ∈ bmo be components of the unique solution of
We fix the random endowments (E i ) i throughout and remind the reader that X i and (m i , n i ) are as in (3.2). Let the function H be defined by
By Lemma 2.2 items (1) and (2), the function p → ∂ 1 h i t (p, ν) is strictly decreasing for each t, ν and i, and its range is R, therefore,
We use it to define the excess-demand map F on bmo by
The significance of this map lies in the simple fact that λ is an equilibrium if and only if F (λ) = λ, i.e., if λ is a fixed point of F . Our first task is to show that H −1 is a Lipschitz function:
Lemma 4.4. There exists a universal constant C such that
Proof. The subscript t is suppressed throughout the proof. To prove (4.10), we start from
To estimate the right-hand side, we compute
. It follows from Lemma 2.2, part (2), that
for each j and all p ∈ R and ν ∈ R I . The estimate (4.10) follows by applying the mean-value theorem to both terms in (4.11).
Next we present a refinement of the classical result on uniform equivalence of bmo spaces (see [Kaz94, Theorem 3.6]), based on a result of Chinkvinidze and Mania (see [CM14] ).
Lemma 4.5. Let σ ∈ bmo be such that ||σ|| bmo =: √ 2R for some R < 1. IfP ∼ P is such that dP dP = E(σ ·B) T , for some F-Brownian motionB, then, for all ζ ∈ bmo, we have
Proof. Since M = σ ·B is a BMO-martingale, Theorem 3.6. in [Kaz94] states that the spaces bmo and bmo(P) coincide and that the norms || · || bmo and || · || bmo(P) are uniformly equivalent. This norm equivalence is refined in [CM14] ; Theorem 2 there implies that
Clearly, only the second inequality in (4.12) needs to be discussed; it is obtained by substituting ζ = σ into the second inequality in (4.13):
To prove the global uniqueness of equilibrium, we record the following a-priori estimate on λ in equilibrium.
Lemma 4.6. There exists a universal constant C such that for any equilibrium λ ∈ bmo
Proof. Supposing that λ ∈ bmo is an equilibrium, we subtract X i from Y i,λ , sum over all i, and use the second equation in (3.3), to obtain
where both stochastic integrals on the right-hand side are BMO-martingales. Using Lemma 2.2 part (4), the previous inequality and the fact that
for each stopping time τ , confirming the claim with C = 1/ √ δγ.
For λ ∈ bmo close enough to 0, the following estimate gives an explicit upper bound on the
(4.14)
Lemma 4.7. There exists a universal constant C such that
, for all i and λ ∈ bmo with ||λ|| bmo < √ 2.
Proof. The variational definition of
, where
With Z denoting the density Z t = E(−λ · B) t , we have
and Itô's formula implies that
The previous estimates, combined with −λm i ≤
and the statement follows from Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 4.8. There exist universal constants C and ǫ < √ 2 such that
where M = max i ||(m i , n i )|| bmo and p = ||λ|| bmo .
Proof. For λ with p = λ bmo < √ 2, let r(p) be as in (4.14) and C 4.7 as in Lemma 4.7 so that
an application of Itô's formula yields
The stochastic integrals on the right-hand side are martingales, since D i is bounded. Using the fact
λ 2 , we conclude there exists a universal constant C such that
It remains to observe that
, rearranging the previous inequality yields
There exists a sufficient small universal costant ǫ such that, when p, M ≤ ǫ,
where the universal constant C on the right-hand side may be different from the one on the left. The statement then follows from combining the previous two inequalities.
Define B bmo (p) = {λ ∈ bmo : λ bmo ≤ p}. The following result shows that the excessdemand map F maps B bmo (p) into itself for an appropriate choice of p, when max i (m i , n i ) bmo is sufficiently small. 
for any p, M ≤ ε 4.8 . Choosing a universal constant C larger than 2C 4.4 C 4.8 and C 4.6 , we have from the previous inequality that
There exists a universal constant ε 0 ≤ ε 4.8 such that the quadratic equation 
. It is then easy to see that
for any λ with λ bmo ≤ε(M).
Lemma 4.10. There exists universal constants ε, C such that, if max
Proof. In the first part of the proof we suppress the index i notationally, as we will be focusing on a single-agent Y λ . For λ,λ ∈ bmo with ||λ|| bmo , ||λ|| bmo < √ 2 and denote by (Y, µ, ν) = (Y λ , µ λ , ν λ ) and (Ỹ ,μ,ν) = (Yλ, µλ, νλ), the corresponding solutions to (2.11). By the argument in the proof of Lemma 4.7, helped by that fact that it terminates at 0, the process δY = Y −Ỹ belongs to S ∞ . We set λ = (λ +λ)/2 and µ = (µ +μ)/2 so that so that, thanks to (2.10), (4.17), and the fact that δY T = 0 we obtain
, for any stopping time τ . This, in turn, implies
The definition of F and Lemma 4.4 imply that it will be enough to replace all bmo-norms under Q λ,ν in (4.18) above, as well as in the expression forL λ ,Lλ, by those under P, perhaps after enlarging the universal constant C. To do that, for M = max i (m i , n i ) bmo ≤ ε 4.9 , where ε 4.9 is the universal constant in Lemma 4.9, take any λ bmo , λ bmo ≤ε(M). Lemma 4.8 implies that 
The proof is concluded after combining and last two inequalities and reintroducing the index i to the left-hand side of (4.20).
1 I E Σ L ∞ , for all i.
Then right-hand side is smaller than M in (3.4) for I larger than some I 0 , and the existence of equilibrium follows from Theorem 3.6. 
and ||E|| EBMO ≤ 2||E|| 
